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This paper develops search-theoretic models in which it is individually rational for firms to engage
in obfuscation. It considers oligopoly competition between firms selling a homogeneous good to a
population of rational consumers who incur search costs to learn each firm's price. Search costs are
endogenized: obfuscation is equated with unobservable actions that make it more time-consuming
to inspect a product and learn its price. We note two mechanisms by which obfuscation can affect
consumer beliefs about future search costs: a direct effect that applies when search costs are convex
in time spent searching and a signal-jamming effect that applies when an informational link is present.
As long as obfuscation is costless for firms, the presence of either of these mechanisms guarantees
that obfuscation must occur in equilibrium, unless consumer search costs are already so high that consumers
are willing to purchase at the highest equilibrium price in the absence of obfuscation.  Changes in
consumer search costs are at least partially offset by changes in the equilibrium level of obfuscation,
raising doubts about whether reductions in consumer search costs must make markets more competitive.
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Anyone who has shopped for a mattress, tried to compare the full sets of fees charged by
multiple banks or mortgage lenders, or gotten quotes from contractors for a home renovation
will nd it easy to question the universality of the classic economic argument that rms will
disclose all relevant information.1 Ellison and Ellison (2009) describe practices in which
rms intentionally make shopping complicated, dicult, or confusing as \obfuscation" and
provide empirical evidence from online shopping. It is easy to think of reasons why it would
be collectively rational for rms to practice obfuscation: equilibrium prices are increasing in
consumer search costs in many search models, and price discrimination arguments can also
be given.2 Arguments based on collective rationality, however, bring up a natural critique:
why collude on obfuscation rather than just colluding directly on price? In this paper, we
discuss a search-based model in which it is individually rational for rms to raise consumer
search costs.
Diamond (1971) rst formalized the connection between search costs and price levels,
noting that even an  search cost could increase prices from the competitive level to the
monopoly level because consumers will have no incentive to search if they expect all rms
to charge monopoly prices. Several subsequent papers developed two other important
insights: there is a more natural search problem when price dispersion is present, and price
dispersion will exist in equilibrium when consumers are dierentially informed.3 Our model
closely follows that of Stahl (1989), who considers a continuum of consumers shopping for
a homogenous good oered by N rms. A fraction  of the consumers have no search costs
and learn all rms' prices. The other 1    pay a search cost of s every time they obtain
a price quote. Consumers have identical downward sloping demands D(p). Stahl shows
that this produces an elegant, tractable model. All consumers with positive search costs
search exactly once. Firms choose prices from a nonatomic distribution on an interval [p;p]
1See Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981).
2Diamond(1971) and many subsequent papers connect search costs and equilibrium price levels. Ellison
(2005) shows that the joint adoption of add-on pricing strategies can increase prices in a competitive price
discrimination model.
3Classic papers include Butters (1977), Salop and Stiglitz (1977), Varian (1980), Rosenthal (1980), and
Burdett and Judd (1983). See Baye and Morgan (2001) for a recent model applied to online markets and
Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2006) for a nice survey including recent developments.
1following mixed strategies like those in Varian (1980) and Rosenthal (1980). The model's
comparative statics clearly bring out the collective incentive to increase search costs: prices
and rm prots increase as the search cost s increases.
Section 2 of our paper introduces our model and derives some preliminary results that
are common to the dierent versions we eventually consider. We model obfuscation in a
very simple way: consumers are assumed to have a disutility that depends on the the total
time spent shopping, and each rm is allowed to choose the length of time that is required
to learn its price. In the bank application, for example, the rm may be choosing the
complexity of its fee structure which determines how long it would take a consumer to read
through the full list of fees for overdrafts, low balances, ATM use, wire transfers, etc. and
estimate what he or she will end up paying each month.4 This time is not observable to
consumers until after they have visited the rm. A number of the basic features of Stahl's
model carry over to our environment: in equilibrium, rms make positive prots and choose
prices from a nonatomic distribution with support [p;p]; and consumers search until the
expected gain from taking another draw from the price distribution exceeds the expected
search costs.
Section 3 analyzes our simplest model of obfuscation. On the rm side obfuscation is
assumed to be costless. On the consumer side we assume that consumers have a strictly
convex disutility g(t) for the time t they spend shopping. We view this as a small departure
from the traditional assumption in a realistic direction: disutility would be convex in a
standard time-allocation model with decreasing returns to leisure; and for many results
g0(t) need only be  greater than g0(0) even in the t ! 1 limit. Yet, it is a departure that
can greatly alter the equilibrium set. Holding obfuscation levels xed our model is much like
Stahl's and the rms' pricing strategies will coincide with those of Stahl's model, with the
search cost parameter set equal to the incremental costs of a second search. The possibility
of doing slightly more obfuscation than consumers expect, however, can have a dramatic
4The \price" the consumer is learning can also be interpreted as the time required to learn the product'
quality and thereby learn a quality-adjusted price. For example, in the case of mattress shopping the price
of each mattress at a store, e.g. \Sealy Posturepedic Ruby", may be readily observable but time will be
required to inquire about product attributes and learn which name corresponds to the mattress the consumer
had seen at another store and/or to make mental adjustments to account for dierences in the attributes of
dierent stores' oerings.
2eect on what is possible in equilibrium. Specically, equilibria in which the upper bound
of the price distribution is strictly less than the monopoly price become impossible because
a rm can simultaneously make small deviations in two dimensions: increase its price to
slightly above p and also slightly increase its obfuscation level. Hence, in all equilibria of
our model the upper bound of the price distribution is the monopoly price. Such an upper
bound on the equilibrium distribution is only possible if equilibrium search costs are above
some lower bound. Therefore, there is a lower bound on the level of equilibrium obfuscation.
The lower bound can be zero, but can also be substantial. Obfuscation hurts consumers in
two ways: consumers incur higher search costs and pay higher prices.
Section 4 considers costly obfuscation. This makes obfuscation levels more determinis-
tic, because in equilibrium each rm must be choosing the minimum level of obfuscation
consistent with the equilibrium level of consumer search. It also allows us to discuss cross-
sectional relationships between prices and obfuscation. For example, in some circumstances
we note that rms with the lowest markups will not obfuscate at all, whereas rms with
the highest markups can only make sales if they are doing substantial obfuscation. We
present results from two dierent modeling approaches. One is an equilibrium renements
approach which can be motivated by thinking of the cost of obfuscating as lexicographically
less important to rms than prots. The other is a more traditional model.
Section 5 considers an alternate mechanism for producing obfuscation. We return to
the traditional assumption that consumers have a linear disutility of search eort, dropping
the strict convexity assumption used in sections 3 and 4. Instead, we depart from Stahl's
model in another direction we nd realistic: we assume that there is common uncertainty
about how much time is required to learn a rm's price in the absence of obfuscation. A key
feature of such models is that consumers' expectations about future search costs increase in
the amount of time it takes them to learn the price of the rst rm they visit. For example,
one could think of this as a model in which consumers are not born knowing how long it
takes to get a price quote from a home improvement contractor and in which consumers who
spend a long time discussing a project with the rst contractor they contact will assume
that the process of getting a bid from another contractor will also be time-consuming.
A natural consequence of such an eect is that obfuscation can occur for signal-jamming
3reasons. Some predictions of the signal-jamming model are similar to the convex costs
model: we provide conditions under which some obfuscation must occur and show that
the equilibrium price distributions are a selection from the set of equilibrium distributions
of Stahl's model. But the mechanism behind the obfuscation is somewhat dierent and
this leads to some interesting dierences in predictions. One is an \excess obfuscation"
result noting that obfuscation is almost always above what is necessary to deter search.
Another is that the selection among the equilibria of Stahl's model is dierent and that
excess obfuscation can eliminate equilibria with very high prices. Some comparative statics
results also dier across the models.
Our paper is related to a number of others. Ellison and Ellison (2009) provide informal
descriptive evidence on obfuscation among a group of e-retailers and present empirical
evidence that suggests that at least two mechanisms are involved: consumers appear to
have a substantially incomplete knowledge of prices, and rms' add-on pricing strategies
appear to create an adverse-selection eect that would be expected to increase equilibrium
markups. A number of subsequent papers have explored obfuscation mechanisms.5 Ellison
(2005) discusses add-on pricing in the context of a competitive price discrimination model.
It notes that add-on pricing is not individually rational in the base model, but could be
made individually rational by adding a subpopulation of irrational consumers who were
exploited by the add-on strategy. Gabaix and Laibson (2006) work out an explicit model
along these lines.
Spiegler (2006) provides an alternate boundedly-rational approach. In his model, con-
sumers are only capable on evaluating products on one of many dimensions. Firms \ob-
fuscate" by randomizing and making the product more attractive on some dimensions (e.g.
making fees lower if some contingency arises) and less attractive on others. He notes that
an increase in the competitiveness of the market (more rms) leads to an increase in obfus-
cation but no change in average prices. This is a somewhat similar in spirit to our nding
that decreases in exogenous search costs don't change average prices because they are fully
oset by a change in obfuscation. But the meaning of obfuscation and the mechanisms
are, of course, completely dierent. His model and ours may dier in other predictions.
5Ellison (2006) includes a survey of some of this literature.
4Eliaz and Spiegler (2008) address some related topics, e.g. whether rms with higher prices
do more or less to inform consumers, in another elegant model with boundedly rational
consumers. Their model, however, is more similar in spirit to the traditional information
revelation literature than to our paper in that informing consumers is the costly action.
Carlin (2008) and Wilson (2008) are most closely related to our paper. Each also
models obfuscation as a strategic decision by rms that increases search costs in a model
with optimal consumer search. Carlin's model diers from ours both in the focus and
in the type of search model it uses. The search model is an all-or-nothing model along
the lines of Salop and Stiglitz (1977) and Varian (1980).6 More importantly, Carlin's
(2008) focus is primarily on how obfuscation aects market prices, whereas some of our
main motivations are to explore why it is individually (as opposed to collectively) rational
to obfuscate and how obfuscation varies in the cross-section. Carlin (2008) does make
obfuscation individually rational and not just collectively rational, but this is done in a
fairly straightforward manner so the paper can focus on other things: consumers observe a
summary statistic (like the average obfuscation level) before deciding whether to conduct
an all-or-nothing search and do not observe any individual rm's obfuscation level, so an
increase in obfuscation by any one rm leads to exactly the same outcome as would a
smaller coordinated increase by all rms.
Wilson (2008) does focus on the question of why obfuscation is individually rational
and develops a very nice argument (which is also very dierent from ours). The primary
dierence between Wilson's model and ours is that Wilson assumes that the rm-specic
search costs are observable to consumers when they choose which stores to visit. One's
rst thought might be that this will make obfuscation impossible, because consumers will
always choose to visit rms with the lowest search costs rst. Wilson's clever observation is
that while it is true that many or all consumers will visit the low-search-cost rm rst, this
does not necessarily render obfuscation unappealing. Obfuscation can provide strategic-
commitment benets: by making itself less attractive to the consumers with positive search
costs, the obfuscating rm induces its rival to focus more on these consumers and raise
prices, which can benet both rms. Our paper diers from his in the assumptions on
6Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2006) refer to these as clearinghouse models.
5observability, in the mechanisms that drive obfuscation, and in the details of many results.
For example, in his paper obfuscating rms tend to charge lower prices, whereas obfuscation
is associated with charging high prices in our model.
2 Model and Preliminary Results
In this section we present our model and derive some basic results. Our model is similar to
that of Stahl (1989) with two additions: search costs are allowed to be a nonlinear function
of the number of searches carried out; and the per-search cost is an endogenous choice of
the rms. The results in this section show that some standard results carry over: consumer
search strategies can be characterized using standard cuto rules, rms earn positive prots
in a dispersed price equilibrium, and equilibrium price distributions are atomless.
2.1 Model
We consider a unit mass of consumers of two types: proportion  are \costless searchers"
who automatically learn all rms' prices and proportion 1    are \costly searchers" who
must incur search cost g(t) to spend a total time t searching. We assume that ascertaining
rm i's price requires time  + ti, where  > 0 is exogenous and ti is the obfuscation level
chosen by rm i. For example,  might be the amount of time it takes to drive to a store or
to access a website, whereas ti might be the amount of time it takes to discover the relevant
price after the store is reached or the website is opened.7 Therefore, a costly searcher would
incur cost g( +t1) to learn the price of a rm that chooses obfuscation level t1 if this is her
rst search and would incur total cost g(2 +t1+t2) if she chose to continue her search and
also learn the price of a second rm that chooses obfuscation level t2. We assume that g()
is twice continuously dierentiable, strictly increasing, and weakly convex with g(0) = 0.
We assume that consumers cannot observe a rm's obfuscation level before they visit it
and learn its price, but do have rational expectations about the distribution of obfuscation
7We assume throughout that consumers can choose to go back to a previously visited rm at zero cost.
This would t the example of Internet search if consumers leave open a browser window containing the best
price they have found. The driving example does not t this property well if consumers must drive back to
a previously visited store to purchase from it, but ts it better if consumers can call the store back on the
phone to order a previously researched product.
6levels.8
As in Stahl (1989), we assume that consumers have downward-sloping demand functions
D(p) that satisfy
R z
0 D(x)dx < 1 for all z  0 and let R(p)  pD(p), the revenue a rm
obtains from selling to consumer with demand D(p) at price p. We assume that R(p) is
continuously dierentiable with unique maximum pm and that R0(p) > 0 if p < pm. Each
rm i out of N  2 rms chooses price pi and obfuscation level ti. Firms produce at zero
marginal cost. Firm i incurs a xed obfuscation cost of c(ti) when it chooses obfuscation
level ti; we assume that the obfuscation cost function is dierentiable with c(0) = 0 and
c0(t)  0 for all t. In some sections we will focus on the case of costless obfuscation, c(t) = 0
for all t, which allows for the simplest results.
The game proceeds as follows. First, rms simultaneously and noncooperatively choose
obfuscation levels and prices. Then, costless searchers automatically learn all rms' prices
and can buy from any rm, and costly searchers search strategically: they draw a new,
randomly selected rm with each search and may stop searching and buy from any rm
they have visited at any point. We say that costly searchers \enter" if they choose to
search at least once. We will look for symmetric Nash Equilibria of this game9; henceforth
by \NE" we mean symmetric Nash Equilibria.10
2.2 Search strategies
In this section we show that standard results on optimal search strategies carry over to
our model. To state this formally, note rst that every symmetric strategy prole induces
a price distribution F(p). If the price distribution is given by F(p) and a consumer has
already spent total time t0 searching and has observed price p0 but no lower prices, then
the consumer's expected cost to searching again is Et [g(t0 +  + t)   g(t0)], whereas her
expected benet from searching again and then buying from the lowest-price rm she has
8In some of our models one could alternately regard consumers as learning the ti after incurring only the
cost , with the option to discontinue search at this point, but such interpretations will require some strong
renement on beliefs to prevent bootstrapped equilibria in which consumers assume that a rm oers a very
unattractive price if its obfuscation level is not exactly equal to some value.
9Note that as usual the assumption that costless searchers automatically learn all rms' prices rather
than searching sequentially with zero search cost is substantive. If we assumed the latter, all rms' setting
price equal to p
m would be an equilibrium, for example.






































where p is the inmum of the support of F(p), and CS(p) is the consumer surplus at price
p.
We begin by showing that optimal consumer search is given by continuing search if
Et [g(t0 +  + t)   g(t0)] < V (p0) and by stopping search if Et [g(t0 +  + t)   g(t0)] >
V (p0).11
Proposition 1 In any NE, a costly searcher stops searching if V (p0) < Et [g(t0 +  + t)   g(t0)]
or if all N rms have been visited and continues searching if V (p0) > Et [g(t0 +  + t)   g(t0)].
We present a formal proof in the appendix. It proceeds by induction on the number of
stores remaining using a two case argument: if the incremental cost of the next search is less
than V (p0), then searching must be optimal because searching exactly once is better than
not searching; and if the incremental cost is greater than V (p0), then not searching must
be optimal because continuing to search is less appealing than it would be if incremental
search costs were constant, and standard results imply that continuing is not optimal in
that case.
2.3 Price equilibrium
In this section we recall some standard results for the case where t is a parameter rather
than a choice variable and show that properties of these equilibria carry over to our model.
11This is not a direct corollary of the classic results since here the expected search costs faced by consumers
depends on the entire history of the obfuscation levels they have encountered.
8Before doing so, we should note that our model sometimes has equilibria in which the
costly searchers are inactive. If exogenous or endogenous search costs are suciently high,
then costly searchers will not get even a single price quote. We will mostly ignore these
equilibria and use the phrase \nontrivial NE" to mean a NE in which the costly searchers
do get at least one price quote.12
Proposition 2 (Stahl 1989) Suppose that every rm's level of obfuscation is xed exoge-
nously at t. Then the price distribution for any nontrivial NE takes one of two possible
forms:
















dp = g(2( + t))   g( + t);



















2. If there does not exist such a value of r, then the equilibrium price distribution is


















Proof. By Proposition 1, costly searchers search for a second time after observing price p0 if
V (p0) > g(2(+t)) g(+t) and do not search for a second time if V (p0) < g(2(+t)) g(+
t). The result then follows immediately from Stahl's analysis for s = g(2( +t)) g( +t).

Note that Proposition 2 can be thought of as showing that two slightly dierent types of
mixed equilibria arise. The rst type arises when search costs are small. In these equilibria,
the constraint that consumers must be willing to buy from a rm oering price p rather
than searching again is binding and pins down the upper bound of the support of the price
distribution. The upper bound of the support and the distribution of prices vary with the
search cost in these equilibria. The second type arises when search costs are larger. In these
12In a trivial NE the fact that only costless searchers are in the market implies that rms are Bertrand
competitors, so rms must price at cost (or at least two rms must do so without the symmetry restriction).
Obfuscation levels would need to be high enough so that costly searchers nonetheless do not want to enter.
9equilibria, consumers strictly prefer buying from the rst rm they visit to getting another
price quote. The upper bound of the price distribution is always the monopoly price. And
the price distribution is also independent of the search cost over the range of search costs
for which this case applies.
When t is exogenously xed, it is well-known that every NE price distribution is atom-
less, that every rm makes positive prots in any NE, and that in any NE every costly
searcher buys from the rst rm she visits. The former two results continue to hold gen-
erally when t is a choice variable, while the last result requires the additional assumption
that obfuscation is costless for rms, which we impose in Section 3.
Lemma 1 Every rm makes positive prots in any nontrivial NE.
Proof. Setting a strictly negative price is strictly dominated, so in any nontrivial NE all
prices are weakly positive. Therefore, if the rst price a costly searcher observes is p0,
then in NE her benet from searching again if every rm sets ti = 0 is
R p0
0 D(x)F(x)dx  
(g(2)   g()) 
R p0
0 D(x)dx   (g(2)   g()), which is negative for p0 suciently close to
0. By convexity of g, her benet from searching again is no greater than this if any rm
sets positive obfuscation. Therefore, in NE any rm can guarantee itself positive prots by
choosing such a suciently small but strictly positive p0, so every rm must make positive
prots in any NE. 
Lemma 2 If F(p) is a nontrivial NE price distribution, then it is atomless.
Proof. By Lemma 1, no rm sets p = 0 in any NE in which costly searchers enter. So if
F(p) has an atom, it must have an atom at some p > 0. But then pricing slightly below
this atom yields strictly higher prots than pricing at the atom, as it yields a discrete gain
in prots from the costless searchers and an arbitrarily small loss in prots from the costly
searchers. 
Lemma 3 If c(t) = 0 for all t, then on the equilibrium path of any NE every costly searcher
searches at most once.
Proof. Let F(p) be a nontrivial NE price distribution for a model with costless obfuscation.
Let  p be the maximum of the support of F(p). Consider a rm that sets price equal to  p. If
10this rm does not sell to any of the costly searchers that visit it rst, then with probability
1 it will not sell to any consumers as, by Lemma 2, every other rm has a lower price
with probability 1 and consumers buy from the lowest-priced rm they visit. This would
contradict Lemma 1, so a rm that sets price equal to  p must sell to some costly searchers
that visit it rst. Furthermore, if consumers mix between buying and not buying from
a rm with price equal to p, then by lowering prices by an arbitrarily small amount the
rm could sell to these consumers with probability 1, by Proposition 1, strictly increasing
prots. So if F(p) is a NE price distribution then every costly searcher who visits a rm
with price equal to p rst buys immediately.
Since those costly searchers who rst visit a highest-priced rm buy from it, any lower-
priced rm could sell to those costly searchers who visit it rst by setting the same obfus-
cation level as the highest-priced rm. And raising one's obfuscation level only increases
the number of consumers one sells to, by our characterization of optimal consumer search,
so if a lower-priced rm did not sell to those costly searchers who visited it rst it could
strictly increase prots by raising its obfuscation level to that of the highest-priced rm.

Note that for Lemma 3 we added an assumption that obfuscation is costless. We believe
that this is necessary given that we have made few assumptions on the g(t) function. To
see why, consider, for example, a g(t) function which is zero up some point and then
follows a strictly convex function with unbounded slope. In this case, rms have the option
of deterring future searches by customers who visit them rst, but may need to incur a
positive obfuscation cost to do so. In such a model it seems plausible that there could be
equilibria in which rms setting low prices choose t = 0 and accept that all customers who
visit them rst will obtain a second quote, while rms with prices near the upper bound
avoid getting zero demand by choosing an obfuscation level sucient to ensure that they
sell to all consumers who visit them rst.
113 An Obfuscation Model: Costless obfuscation and convex
disutility of search
In this section we analyze our model under the assumption that obfuscation is costless and
consumer disutility for shopping, g(t), is strictly convex. The convex search costs assump-
tion is a departure from much of the previous literature, but we think it is a departure
that is worth exploring for two reasons. First, we think it is descriptively accurate: search
costs would be convex in a textbook consumer-theory model of time allocation if there
are decreasing returns to leisure. Second, it turns out that even small departures from
more traditional assumptions in this directions can have dramatic eects on equilibrium
outcomes.
The rst subsection below discusses the impact that of the convex-search costs as-
sumption on the possible distributions of equilibrium prices. We show that some of the
equilibrium price distributions of Stahl's model remain equilibria and some do not. The
second subsection discusses equilibrium obfuscation levels. The costlessness of obfuscation
results in a degree of indeterminacy, but the result on price distributions implies that there
is a lower bound on the amount of obfuscation that can occur in equilibrium. The results
only require a slight departure from the more traditional linear search cost assumption in
that they will apply even if g0(t) is uniformly bounded above by g0(0)+ for a small positive
.
3.1 Equilibrium price distributions
We may now state our rst main result characterizing price distributions with endogenous
search costs: if costly searchers search, F(p) is a NE price distribution of the model with
endogenous obfuscation if and only if it is a NE price distribution of Stahl's model with
search costs xed at some level and has the upper bound of its support equal to pm. In
other words, NE price distributions of the second possible form in the characterization of
Proposition 2 remain as possible equilibria, whereas equilibrium price distributions of the
rst form (and all other distributions) cannot arise in our endogenous obfuscation model.
12Proposition 3 F(p) is a price distribution for a nontrivial NE only if











for all p 2
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p;pm





R(pm). Such a price distribution
is a nontrivial NE price distribution if and only if g()  V (1).
Proof. We rst show that any such F(p) is a NE price distribution if g()  V (1).
Consider the following equations:








Since g() is strictly increasing and convex with g(0) = 0, we have g(2( + t))   g( + t) 
g(+t) and limt!1 g(2(+t)) g(+t) = 1. Together with g()  V (1) and g continuous,
this implies that there exist t 2 R+ that satisfy both (2) and (3). Suppose that each rm
chooses obfuscation level equal to such a t. By equation (3), all consumers will search
once; by equation (2) and our characterization of optimal consumer search, no consumer
will search more than once. Now a rm that chooses price pm obtains prot
1 
N R(pm),
while a rm that chooses price p < pm obtains prot
h





easy to check that these are equal for all p 2

p;pm
when F(p) is given by equation (1),
while prots associated with any p outside this interval are strictly smaller. So F(p) is a
NE price distribution supported by any t satisfying equations (2) and (3).
Now suppose that costly searchers enter and that F(p) is not given by equation (1). We









for all p in the support of F. If p > pm, a rm could deviate to pm and make strictly
higher prots from both costless and costly searchers. Suppose  p < pm. By Lemma
3, if a rm plays (ti; p) in NE then Et [g(2 + ti + t)   g( + ti)] 
R  p
p D(p)F(p)dp. So,
by strict convexity of g, there exist ", "0 such that Et [g(2 + ti + " + t)   g( + ti + ")] >
R  p+"0
p D(p)F(p)dp, so if such a rm deviated to playing (ti +";  p+"0) then a consumer will
prefer to buy at price  p + "0 rather than searching again when the rm's obfuscation level
13is ti +". This deviation gives the rm strictly higher prots from the costly searchers and
makes no dierence to its prots from the costless searchers, since at price  p it had zero
probability of selling to these consumers (by Lemma 2) and still has zero probability of
selling to them at price  p + ".









Then it is easy to check that prots at p do not equal prots at  p, contradicting that p and
 p are both in the support of F.
Finally, if g() > V (1), then costly searchers will not search when the price distribution
is F(p), so there is no nontrivial NE with price distribution F(p). 
Proposition 3 shows that the costless obfuscation model looks much like Stahl's model,
with the important dierence that equilibria with  p < pm are ruled out. In particular, any
symmetric equilibrium of the costless obfuscation model has the same price distribution as
Stahl's model with  p = pm, which is also the same price distribution as in Varian (1980)
and Rosenthal (1980).
Note that Proposition 3 makes no assumptions on the consumer search cost function g
other than that it is strictly convex. Our intuition for why making g even slightly convex can
have a large eect on the equilibrium set follows very much along the lines of the proof: we
should think about the possibility that rms can simultaneously deviate to a price slightly
above the upper bound of the equilibrium price distribution and an obfuscation level that
is slightly higher than consumers expect. In Stahl's model, rms are indierent between
all prices in the interval [p;p] because price distributions adjust so that there is a tradeo
between the number of consumers served and the prot per consumer. Equilibria of Stahl's
model must also be such that rms do not gain from deviating to a price above p. This
happens because (in equilibria of the rst type) this would lead consumers to get another
price quote or (in equilibria of the second type) this would be counterproductive because
p = pm. In our model, a rm can raise a consumer's incremental search costs from another
search by at least some small amount by increasing its obfuscation level. This would allow
the rm to make sales at some price p + . Hence, any equilibrium of Stahl's model with
p < pm does not survive.
143.2 Equilibrium obfuscation levels
We now consider equilibrium obfuscation levels and note that obfuscation can have sub-
stantial eects on search costs and consumer surplus. The fact that all equilibria must have
p = pm puts a lower bound on equilibrium search costs|consumers must not be willing to
conduct a second search when they have found price pm and know that prices are drawn
from the distribution given in Proposition 3. If the exogenous component  of the search
costs is not too large, this implies that rms must obfuscate in equilibrium.
Corollary 1 If g(2) g() <
R pm
p D(p)F(p)dp, where F(p) is given by equation (1), then
in any nontrivial NE some rms set t > 0.
Proof. By Proposition 3, rms are willing to set price equal to pm in any NE in which
costly searchers enter. If g(2)   g() <
R pm
p D(p)F(p)dp and ti = 0 for all i, then a costly
searcher who rst observes a price suciently close to pm will search again, contradicting
Lemma 3. 
We next note the basic welfare consequences of obfuscation. Consumers suer both
directly from the eect of obfuscation on search costs and indirectly because obfuscation
leads to higher prices. Firm benet from the higher prices.
Corollary 2 Suppose g(2)   g() <
R pm
p D(p)F(p)dp, where F(p) is given by equation
(1). Compared to the model in which obfuscation is impossible (t = 0 identically for all
rms), the model in which obfuscation is possible leads to higher prices in sense of rst-
order stochastic dominance, higher prots for all rms, and lower utility for all consumers
in every nontrivial NE.
Proof. In the model where t = 0, the possible nontrivial NE price distributions are given
by Proposition 1. If obfuscation is possible, the nontrivial NE price distribution is given
by Proposition 3. Since the formula for F(p) is the same in both cases and is decreasing
in  p for all p, prices are higher in the sense of rst-order stochastic dominance in the latter
NE. This and the fact that obfuscation reduces consumer welfare directly imply that in
the latter NE rms earn higher prots and consumer welfare is lower. 
15One striking fact about Proposition 3 and Corollaries 1 and 2 is that, as long as g() 
V (1), any reduction in the exogenous xed component of consumer search costs has no
eect whatsoever on the equilibrium distribution of prices and prots|any reduction in
 that would lead to lower prices must be oset by changes in the equilibrium level of
obfuscation. Hence, our model provides a formalization of the observation in Ellison and
Ellison (2009) that improvements in search technology need not make search more ecient.
Their empirical ndings are consistent with the idea that the reduction in search costs
online have led to greater equilibrium obfuscation, although probably not with the extreme
nding of this section that the response can be so large as to keep the price distribution
unchanged.13
3.3 Comparative statics with price-independent obfuscation
The assumption that obfuscation is costless leads to a degree of indeterminacy in obfus-
cation levels: obfuscation can vary within a range as long as it is not so low as to induce
consumers to search for a second time after seeing price pm, nor so high as to deter con-
sumer entry; and obfuscation can also covary with prices in many ways. Here, we provide
some comparative statics results by restricting attention to equilibria in which obfuscation
levels are independent of the realization of the mixture over prices.
All the comparative statics results in this paper (Propositions 4, 5, 6, 16, 17, 18 and 19)
depend on the fact that, if obfuscation is costless, costly searchers must enter and then buy
from the rst rm they visit in any nontrivial NE. We call these requirements the \entry"
and \stopping" conditions; in the current model, when all rms set obfuscation level t, these
conditions are equations (2) and (3), respectively. The entry condition requires that total
search costs be suciently low, while the stopping condition requires that total search costs
be suciently high. Note that, as long as obfuscation is not too concentrated in rms that
charge the highest prices, the condition that a consumer who rst visits a rm charging p
does not want to search again is sucient for the stopping condition. In the current model,
both the entry and stopping conditions can always be satised simultaneously in equilibria
with  p = pm as long as the entry condition is satised when all rms set zero obfuscation
13The markups they report are lower than one would nd in traditional retail.
16(i.e. g()  V (1)), because a consumer's benet from a second search is always lower than
the benet from a rst search, while the cost of a second search is always higher than the
cost from a rst search. We will see that this is no longer true in the signal-jamming model
of Section 5.
Also, since our models may admit multiple equilibria, all comparative statics are on sets
of equilibria with respect to the strong set order. Recall that a (one-dimensional) set X is
higher than Y in the strong set order if, given elements x in X and y in Y , the maximum
of x and y is in X while the minimum of x and y is in Y .
Our rst result identies a sense in which obfuscation levels must rise when the exoge-
nous component of search costs falls.
Proposition 4 The set of obfuscation values tu (for \u"niform) played in any nontrivial
NE in which rms do not mix over obfuscation levels is decreasing in , the xed component
of consumer search costs, in the strong set order.
Proof. As in the proof of Proposition 3, the lower bound on tu is given by g(2(+tu)) g(+
tu) =
R pm
p D(p)F(p)dp and the upper bound on tu is given by g( +tu) =
R 1
p D(p)F(p)dp,
so an increase in  causes both of these bounds to decrease. 
Proposition 4 shows that changes in equilibrium obfuscation oset changes in the ex-
ogenous component of search costs. This follows because high exogenous search costs rule
out equilibria with high obfuscation, by the entry condition, and eliminate the need for
high obfuscation, by the stopping condition. That is, costly searchers will not be willing
to obtain a price quote if they face both high exogenous search costs and high obfusca-
tion, and rms have no need to set high obfuscation when consumers are already deterred
from comparison-shopping by high exogenous search costs. This eect, however, is weak
enough that an increase in  must nonetheless lead to a decrease in the set of nontrivial
NE values of consumer welfare. The intuition is that prices are xed by Proposition 3 and
any nontrivial NE value of consumer welfare given 0   can be reproduced by uniformly
increasing obfuscation by 0   . Note that Proposition 5 does not restrict attention to
equilibria with price-independent obfuscation.
Proposition 5 The set of nontrivial NE values of the costly searchers' welfare is decreasing
17in  in the strong set order.
Proof. Note that consumer welfare u is given by u  V (1)   E[g(t + )]. Suppose that
0   and u0  u, where u is a nontrivial NE value of consumer welfare with xed search
cost  and u0 is a nontrivial NE value of consumer welfare with xed search cost 0. We
must show that u0 is a nontrivial NE value with search cost  and that u is a nontrivial NE
value with search cost 0.
First, suppose that u0 is the value of consumer welfare for a nontrivial NE with price
distribution F(p) and obfuscation strategies given as a function of price t0(p). Note that
t0(p) can be a probability distribution over obfuscation levels, if rms mix over obfuscation
levels given their prices. Consider the prole where rms price according to F(p) and use
obfuscation strategies t(p) = t0(p) + 0     t0(p)  0, where if t0(p) is a probability
distribution over obfuscation levels this is interpreted as shifting this distribution up by
0   . It is clear that this prole is a nontrivial NE when xed search costs are given
by , because at every history a consumer's expected future total search cost when the
xed component is given by  and the variable component is given by t(p) is the same as
when the xed component is given by 0 and the variable component is given by t0(p). And
consumer welfare in this NE is u0.
Next, suppose again that u, u0 and t0(p) are as above. To show that u is also a nontrivial
NE value when the exogenous search cost is equal to 0, we suppose that rms draw prices
from F(p) and obfuscate according to t(p) = t0(p) + , where  is such that E[g(t0(p) +  +
)   g(t0(p) + )] = u0   u. Note rst that t(p)  t0(p) implies that every costly searcher
searches at most once, because compared to the original NE, search costs have increased
while search benets remain constant. Second, the fact that the equilibrium utility of each
type of consumer is identical to the utility that the same consumer gets in the nontrivial
NE with utility u in the game with exogenous search costs  implies that costly searchers
are willing to enter. Hence, this prole is a nontrivial NE with payo u in the game with
exogenous search costs 0. 
In addition one can use the comparative statics presented in Stahl (1989) to derive a
number of other comparative statics results. For example, we can show that the lower and
18upper bounds on the NE obfuscation level are both increasing in the proportion of costless
searchers. The reason again follows from considering the entry and stopping conditions.
When there are more costless searchers, Stahl shows that NE prices are lower in the sense
of rst-order stochastic dominance. Therefore, more obfuscation is needed to prevent costly
searchers who rst observe price pm from searching again, so the lower bound on equilibrium
obfuscation increases by the stopping condition. Similarly, lower prices imply that costly
searchers would be willing to enter despite higher obfuscation, so the upper bound on
equilibrium obfuscation increases by the entry condition.
Proposition 6 The set of obfuscation levels tu played in any nontrivial NE where rms
do not mix over obfuscation levels is increasing in , the proportion of costless searchers,
in the strong set order.


















in any pure-strategy nontrivial NE, so F(p) is increasing in  for all p and p is decreasing
in . The lower bound on tu is given by g(2( + tu))   g(tu) =
R pm
p D(p)F(p)dp, so it is
increasing in F(p) and therefore increasing in . Similarly, the upper bound on tu is given
by g( + tu) =
R 1
p D(p)F(p)dp, so it is increasing in F(p) and therefore in  as well. 
One can easily show that the set of values of consumer welfare is increasing in . The
connection between Proposition 6 and this fact is the same as that between Propositions 4
and 5: raising  (or decreasing ) leads to higher obfuscation only because costly searchers
benet more from entering the market when  is high (or  is low) and are thus willing to
tolerate more obfuscation, so obfuscation cannot be so much higher that costly searchers
benet less on net from entering.
4 Costly Obfuscation
In some cases, practices that frustrate consumers are simply failures by rms to provide
information that they could provide at no (or very little) cost. For example, the computer
memory retailers studied in Ellison and Ellison (2009) could easily add pages to their sites
explaining what \Cas Latency" means and how important it is or is not for consumers
using various applications. In other examples, however, it seems likely that rms incur real
19costs when they engage in obfuscation: mattress stores must incur some costs in getting
manufacturers to label products with unique names; car dealers could presumably reduce
their sales sta if they used posted prices; and banks must incur customer service costs to
deal with questions and complaints that arise from their complicated fee structures.
In this section we explore such applications by considering the case when the obfuscation
cost c(t) that rms must incur in order to raise the time cost of search to t is not identically
zero. Obfuscation costs will naturally eliminate much of the indeterminacy of the costless
model, as rms will not want to do any more obfuscation than is necessary to limit consumer
search to its equilibrium level. Making obfuscation costly thereby creates more deterministic
relationships between price and obfuscation in the cross-section, which we will characterize.
The two subsections do this in two dierent ways. The rst is an equilibrium renements
approach: we simply posit that it is reasonable to expect that equilibria would satisfy a
given minimal obfuscation condition and characterize equilibria satisfying the renement.
The second takes the more standard approach of having rms maximize a prot function
that includes explicit obfuscation costs.
4.1 Slightly costly obfuscation
In this section we examine the implications of costly obfuscation in a somewhat nonstan-
dard way: rather than explicitly introducing a small obfuscation cost, we rene the set
of equilibria of the costless obfuscation model. We do this because we feel that this is a
parsimonious way to bring out our several insights. But it also has some drawbacks: one
can debate the renement; and the equilibrium existence theorem we can provide requires
more convexity of the g function than we would like. Readers who will be too bothered by
these drawbacks can skip to the next section which derives results similar to some of the
results of this section using a more standard approach.
We will call a nontrivial NE of that model a minimal obfuscation NE if conditional on
each realization of rm i's price, rm i always chooses the lowest obfuscation level that
yields the same prot, i.e. (p;t) is not in the support of rm i's mixed strategy if there
exists a (p;t0) with t0 < t that yields the same prot. This could be roughly motivated by
thinking about obfuscation costs that exist but are lexicographically less important than
20prots, but our renement does not impose all restrictions that this would imply.14 We
characterize the price-obfuscation relationship in these equilibria, and also gain insight into
what obfuscation levels are feasible in any nontrivial NE.
As a rst step in the analysis, we provide conditions for the existence of a minimal
obfuscation NE.
Proposition 7 Assume that limt!1 g0(t) = 1. Let ~ t be such that
g(2 + ~ t)   g( + ~ t) = V (pm)
If g( + ~ t)  V (1), then there exists a minimal obfuscation NE.
The proof is presented in the Appendix. The main idea is that a symmetric mixed
strategy prole is a minimal obfuscation NE if and only if rms choose prices from [p;pm]
according to F(p) and choose an obfuscation level t(p) conditional on each price realization
satisfying
t(pi) = inffti 2 R+ : Ep[g(2 + t(p) + ti)   g( + ti)]  V (pi)g: (4)
We show the existence of such a function t by applying Schauder's Fixed Point Theorem
to the operator given by
T(t(p))(pi) = inffti 2 R+ : Ep[g(2 + t(p) + ti)   g( + ti)]  V (pi)g:
Note that the assumption that limt!1 g0(t) = 1 is needed to guarantee that the op-
erator T is well-dened. Similar assumptions are made in many literatures in which some
function is convex, but we regard the assumption as unappealing because part of what makes
our basic argument striking is that it only requires that g be slightly convex. Note also that
we had avoided making any such assumption in our earlier results. Indeed, in Lemma 3 and
Proposition 3 among other places our arguments could have been substantially simpler if
we had been willing to make such an assumption. The condition g( +~ t)  V (1) says that
costly searchers enter the market when rms obfuscate to the point where a costly searcher
14It is not equivalent to the lexicographic formulation because we are only requiring that obfuscation be
minimal conditional on the price the rm has chosen, not also that the rm only mix over prices which are
compatible with doing the least possible obfuscation.
21is indierent between searching and stopping conditional on observing p = pm and t = ~ t
when she expects all other rms to set t = 0. This rather strong assumption is necessary
to ensure that costly searchers enter when obfuscation levels are given by a xed point of
T.
The characterization of a minimal obfuscation NE given by (4) makes it easy to under-
stand the price-obfuscation relationship. There will be a subinterval [p;p0] on which t(p) is
identically zero, because even the lowest possible search costs, g(2) g(), will be sucient
to deter consumers who nd prices suciently close to p from getting a second price quote.
At higher price levels, obfuscation levels are positive and strictly increasing in p. At the
highest prices, obfuscation levels must be above the minimum possible uniform obfuscation
level tu identied in the previous section.15 Note that this increasing pattern contrasts with
the predictions of the model of Wilson (2008). In Wilson's two-rm model, the rm that
obfuscates chooses prices from a distribution that is lower than the distribution from which
the non-obfuscating rm chooses its prices.
Another benet of having characterized and shown the existence of minimal obfuscation
NE is that we gain additional insight into what levels of obfuscation are possible in the
costless model. In the previous section, we characterized the lowest and highest possible
levels of obfuscation in a NE in which all rms choose the same obfuscation level. We note
here that the lowest tu which is possible in a NE with price-independent obfuscation is not
a lower bound on the expected obfuscation in any NE. Indeed, we show that the average
obfuscation level in any minimal obfuscation NE|which must exist by Proposition 7|is
lower.
Proposition 8 Let tu be the minimum obfuscation level such that there exists a nontrivial
NE in which all rm use obfuscation level tu. This tu is given by









15This latter fact is actually shown in the proof of Proposition 8 below.
22be the average obfuscation level in this equilibrium. Then  t < tu.
Proof. We rst claim that t(pm) > tu. For suppose, towards a contradiction, that
t(pm)  tu. Then
Ep [g(2 + t(pm) + t(p))   g( + t(pm))] < g(2 + t(pm) + tu)   g( + t(pm))
as t(p)  tu for all p with strict inequality on a set of positive measure (since t(p) is
strictly increasing in p in a neighborhood of pm). Convexity of g gives
g(2 + t(pm) + tu)   g( + t(pm))  g(2( + tu))   g( + tu)
and g(2( + tu))   g( + tu) = V (pm), so combining the inequalities yields
Ep [g(2 + t(pm) + t(p))   g( + t(pm))] < V (pm)
contradicting the hypothesis that all costly searchers buy after at most one search when
obfuscation levels are given by t(p).
Now, arguing by contradiction once again, suppose that  t  tu. Then
Ep [g(2 + t(pm) + t(p))   g( + t(pm))] > g(2 + t(pm) +  t)   g( + t(pm))
 g(2 + t(pm) + tu)   g( + t(pm))
> g(2( + tu))   g( + tu) = V (pm)
contradicting the requirement that the rm setting price pm cannot cut its obfuscation level
and still sell to costly searchers when obfuscation levels are given by t(p). Note that the
rst and third inequalities above follow from strict convexity of g, while the second simply
uses that g is increasing. 
The highest level of obfuscation that is possible in a NE in which all rms choose the
same obfuscation level and consumers enter (as identied by equation (3) in the previous
section) can easily be seen to be a tight upper bound on what is possible in any NE.
Proposition 9 Let  t be the average obfuscation level in any nontrivial NE. Then  t  t
u,
where t






23Proof. If costly searchers enter, then




where the expectation on the left side is over the marginal distribution induced by rms'
mixed strategies. The convexity of g implies that g( +  t)  E[g( + t)]  g( + t
u), so
 t  t
u. 
Thus, considering NE in which obfuscation levels are not constant and price-independent
shows that there may exist nontrivial NE with less obfuscation than those described in
Section 3, though not with more obfuscation.
4.2 Truly costly obfuscation
In this section we consider the impact of obfuscation costs in a more standard way. Specif-
ically, we assume that a rm must pay a cost c(t) to set obfuscation level t, where c(0) = 0
and c is strictly increasing and convex. We provide some results analogous to those of the
previous section and also note some ways in which the equilibria change.
Our rst observation is that whether the equilibrium diers from that of the costless-
obfuscation model depends on the search cost function, rather than on the obfuscation cost
function.
Proposition 10 Let V (p) be the consumer benet from search assuming that prices are
distributed as in the nontrivial NE of the costless-obfuscation model.
(a) If g() < V (1) and g(2) g() > V (pm), then the model with costly obfuscation has a
unique nontrivial NE, in which no obfuscation occurs and the equilibrium price distribution
coincides with that of the costless-obfuscation model.
(b) If g(2)   g() < V (pm), then any nontrivial NE of the costly obfuscation model must
have prices distributed on an interval [p;p] with p strictly less than pm.
Proof. For part (a) note that the the conditions on g imply that consumers will search once
and will not search a second time if rms mix over prices as they do in the equilibrium of
the costless obfuscation model. Hence, the same calculations as for the costless obfuscation
model apply and show that there is no protable deviation that involves zero obfuscation.
24Deviations that involve positive obfuscation are also not protable, because they cannot
lead to making greater sales (for any price weakly less than pm) and any obfuscation costs
incurred will only reduce prots.
For part (b), note rst that Lemmas 1 and 2 imply that prices are distributed according
to some atomless distribution F on some interval [p;p] with p > c. We must have p  pm
because any price greater than p > pm is dominated by setting p = pm and using the same
obfuscation level. We claim that rms setting prices p0 in a neighborhood of p must sell to
all consumers who visit them rst. To see this, rst note that if they did not sell to any
consumers who visit them rst then they earn arbitrarily small prots (which is impossible,
since all rms must earn the same, strictly positive level of prots in any NE), as consumers
purchase only from the lowest-price rm they visit, and rms with prices close to pm have
a vanishingly small probability of being the lowest-price rm visited by any consumer who
has searched more than once. And if such a rm sells to only some of those consumers
that visit it rst, it can cut prices by an arbitrarily small amount and sell to all of these
consumers, yielding a discrete gain in prots. Such rms must also be choosing positive
obfuscation levels satisfying




where F(p) is the equilibrium price distribution. Indeed, they cannot set lower obfuscation
levels because such levels would cause consumers to search again and result in these rms
earning near-zero prots; and level of t(p0) implied by this equation cannot be negative
because then no rms would engage in obfuscation and F would be the distribution from
the previous section, which we have assumed to induce further search. Hence, for all p0





This expression is strictly decreasing for p0 near pm, because R0(pm) = 0 and the cost term
has a nonzero derivative. Hence, p cannot be equal to pm. 
The main dierence between the equilibrium of the costless obfuscation model and
what part (b) notes is possible with costly obfuscation is that costly obfuscation implies
25that p < pm. The last line of the proof contains all the intuition: prices must be bounded
away from the monopoly price because if p = pm then there is a rst-order gain from
reducing the level of obfuscation necessary to deter consumer search, and no rst-order loss
in per customer prots.
Note also that in the course of the proof of part (b) we have shown that some obfuscation
must occur in any nontrivial NE in that case: rms with prices near p must engage in
obfuscation because otherwise consumers will conduct a second search and the rms will
earn zero prots.
In our slightly costly model we had a simple expression for the obfuscation level of each
rm. The analog to that conclusion is:
Proposition 11 In any nontrivial NE, a rm that sets price p0 must set obfuscation level
t(p0) such that




The proof of this proposition is immediate: there is no point in doing any more ob-
fuscation than is necessary to deter further consumer search. What is more noteworthy
is what is not in the proposition: we do not claim that the equation holds with equality
whenever obfuscation is necessary to deter further consumer search. The reason is that
rms who have chosen low prices may choose to do little or no obfuscation even though
this may induce consumers to conduct a second search | unlike in the textbook model
with constant search costs, consumers in our model have convex search costs, so they may
search just one more time and then return to the rst rm with high probability. We think
this adds realism to the model and it results in some interesting patterns. For example,
search can be nonmonotone in prices with consumers who nd very low prices purchasing
right away, consumers who nd slightly higher prices searching a second time before giving
up, and consumers who nd the highest prices buying immediately because the high-priced
rms engage in sucient obfuscation to use up the time consumers were willing to spend
searching.
An unfortunate consequence of this feature is that it makes characterizing equilibrium
strategies cumbersome: demand is a complicated function of the vector of prices and there
26is no neat expression for the equilibrium F as there is when consumers search exactly once
in equilibrium. Nevertheless, several important properties of the distribution of equilibrium
obfuscation levels carry over from the slightly costly obfuscation case. As before, there is
an interval of positive length [p;p0] on which rms set zero obfuscation, as the exogenous
component of search costs is sucient to deter a second search for consumers who rst
observe a price suciently close to p. And there is another interval of positive length
[p00;p] on which rms set obfuscation such that the inequality in Proposition 11 holds with
equality16, so that obfuscation is increasing in price. Furthermore, a rm that sets price
p must also set the highest obfuscation level; since such a rm sells to costly searchers
that visit it with probability one, any other rm need not obfuscate so much to sell to its
customers with probability one, and beyond this point there is no incentive to obfuscate.
The only potential dierence in the pattern of equilibrium obfuscation across rms between
the slightly costly and truly costly obfuscation models, then, is that in the truly costly
obfuscation model the union of the intervals [p;p0] and [p00;p] need not equal [p;p]. That is,
in both models the lowest-priced rms do not use obfuscation and the highest-priced rms
use the most obfuscation, but only in the slightly costly obfuscation model can we rule out
nonmonotonicity in the obfuscation level.
Indeed, it seems quite possible that one could construct an example with nonmonotone
obfuscation if obfuscation is truly costly for rms. We sketch such an example here: Suppose
that c(t) is very small up to a point t and increases rapidly thereafter, and that that g(t)
and  are such that no consumer is ever willing to search three times but a consumer may
search a second time if the obfuscation she encountered on her rst search was suciently
low. We conjecture that there exist parameters such that rms with the lowest prices
set t = 0 and sell to consumers on their rst search, rms with slightly higher prices set
t 2 (0;t) and sell to consumers on their rst search (since doing so is not very costly), rms
with intermediate prices set t = 0 and sell to consumers on their second search (since setting
high enough obfuscation to sell to consumers on their rst search would be very expensive),
rms with even higher prices set t 2 (0;t) and sell to consumers on their second search,
and rms with the highest prices set t  t and sell to consumers on their rst search (since
16This is shown in the proof of Proposition 10.
27such rms would hardly ever sell if they did not sell to consumers on their rst search).
5 A Signal-Jamming Model
In this section we explore an alternate mechanism through which obfuscation can aect
consumer search. At the broadest level, our signal-jamming model is another way to reach
the conclusions that rms obfuscate in equilibrium and that this aects the equilibrium
price distribution. But the mechanics of the argument are dierent, and this leads to
some dierences in the results. Among these are an \excess obfuscation" problem that
can prevent the existence of equilibria with consumer entry, a dierent selection among the
possible equilibria of Stahl's model, and the presence of eects that can change comparative
statics results. In particular, there is no longer a unique equilibrium price distribution, and
the set of equilibrium price distributions depends on parameters in interesting ways.
The basic idea behind our signal-jamming mechanism is straightforward. We assume
that search costs are linear rather than convex. But we assume that there is uncertainty
about the exogenous component of search costs. Consumers learn about this component
from their rst shopping experience, so obfuscation raises consumer expectations about the
search costs they will incur on future searches. This mechanism seems plausible for many
applications. For example, if a home-improvement contractor spends a long time with a
consumer discussing details about the job and takes a long time to prepare and submit his
or her bid, then it seems plausible that consumers will expect that getting a second bid will
entail similar time costs.
Formally, we assume that there is an underlying parameter  with expectation zero
distributed with continuous, strictly positive density h() on [;1) with  >  , such that
it costs a consumer ~ ti =  +  + ti to visit a rm that sets obfuscation level ti. We assume
that when a consumer visits rm i, she observes only ~ ti and pi, so that she must draw
inferences about  in equilibrium. The timing of the game is almost as before. The one
amendment is that we assume that  is drawn once and for all at the beginning of the game
and is unobserved by both rms and consumers.17
We focus in this section on costless obfuscation. As before, this lets us bring out our
17We assume that rms do not observe  to avoid a large multiplicity of signaling equilibria.
28main observations most simply. We also restrict our attention to strategies for rms which
do not mix over obfuscation levels for a given price. That is, we consider equilibria in which
there exists a function t(p) such that the support of rms' mixed strategies is contained
in the set of ordered pairs (p;t) with t = t(p). The import of the assumption is that
equilibrium implies that consumers believe with probability one that  = ^   ~ t ( +t(p))
after observing total search cost ~ t and price p18. The only exception to this, of course,
is if the observed (p;t) is inconsistent with equilibrium, which can happen if p not in the
support of the equilibrium price distribution or if ~ t <  + t(p) + . We do not restrict
beliefs in this case, but will, of course, assume that consumers act rationally given some
belief about . Throughout this section we'll write PBE as a shorthand for \symmetric
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which rms do not mix over obfuscation levels for a given
price."
5.1 Consumer search behavior
In this section we note that consumer search behavior in the signal-jamming model is similar
to search behavior in our previous model. First, we have a straightforward application of
standard results.
Proposition 12 In any PBE, a costly searcher searches for the rst time if  + E[t(p)] <
V (1) and continues to search if  +^ +E[t(p)] < V (p0) and there are previously unsearched
rms remaining. Conversely, a costly searcher does not search for the rst time if  +
E[t(p)] > V (1) and stops searching if  + ^  + E[t(p)] > V (p0).
Next, we observe that costless search implies that costly searchers search at most once
in equilibrium, as in the previous model.
Proposition 13 In any PBE of the signal-jamming model with costless obfuscation, all
costly searchers search at most once.
Proof. Fix a PBE obfuscation strategy t(p) and suppose that a rm does not sell to all
costly searchers that visit it rst when it sets price p and obfuscation level t(p). A consumer
18Without this result, the consumer search problem would become much more complicated, as consumers
would have an incentive to search multiple times in order to learn more about .
29who rst visits a rm with price p will buy if ~ t t(p)+E[t(p)] > V (p), since in equilibrium
the consumer infers that  = ~ t   (t(p) + ) whenever she observes total search cost ~ t and
price p. Therefore, a rm can always induce those consumers who visit it rst to buy with
probability 1 by setting t > t(p) + V (p)   E[t(p)]. By Proposition 12, this maximizes the
market share of the rm, so there cannot be a PBE in which a rm does not sell to all
consumers who visit it rst. 
The fact that consumers search at most once will again allow us to provide simple,
closed-form expressions for the possible PBE price distributions. It is the primary place
where we use the assumption that the distribution of  is unbounded. If  is bounded, it
may be that consumers sometimes search multiple times.
5.2 Equilibrium prices and obfuscation
The fact that equilibrium consumer search is similar in the two models will lead to similar-
ities in the equilibrium outcomes between the signal-jamming model and our earlier convex
search cost model. But the way in which rms can use obfuscation to inuence consumer
behavior diers across the two models. In this section we bring out the dierences in what
rms can do and note the eect this has on equilibrium outcomes.
We rst note that there are more serious obstacles to the existence of equilibria in which
p = pm in the signal-jamming model.
Proposition 14 Let V (p0) 
R p0
p D(p)F(p)dp be the value of search when prices are drawn
from the NE of the model with convex search costs and costless obfuscation described in
Proposition 3. The signal-jamming model has a nontrivial PBE with a price distribution
having support [p;pm] if and only if   V (1) and
R 1
pm D(p)dp   .
Proof. Because consumers search once, such an equilibrium must have prices distributed
as in Proposition 3. Hence, V is the value to consumers of an additional search. Let  t be
the average level of obfuscation. Consumers will search exactly once if and only if entry
and stopping conditions hold.  +  t  V (1) is needed to allow consumers to conduct an
initial search. And  +  +  t  V (pm) is needed to prevent consumers who nd price pm
and discover that  =  from searching a second time. There exists a value of  t satisfying
30both constraints if and only if V (1)  V (pm)    and   V (1).19 The rst of these
conditions is equivalent to




Finally, if prices are distributed on [p;pm] as in Proposition 3 and all consumers purchase
from the rst store they visit, rms have no protable deviation, since they are indierent
between charging any two prices in [p;pm] and earn lower prots from charging outside this
interval. 
The rst condition in the Proposition,   V (1), is simply the requirement that the
exogenous search costs are not high enough to prevent consumers from searching at least
once. It is analogous to the sole condition required for the existence of a nontrivial NE in
the convex search cost model. The second condition,
R 1
pm D(p)dp   , is an additional
restriction requiring that the consumer surplus from purchasing at the monopoly price also
be suciently large relative to the uncertainty about . This reects that there is what one
can think of as \excess obfuscation" in the signal-jamming model with costless obfuscation.
In equilibrium, rms must obfuscate to the point where consumers will not want to search
again even when the exogenous component of search costs turns out to take on its lowest
possible value. This implies that, with probability one, the average obfuscation level in any
PBE is higher than the minimal average obfuscation level needed to keep all costly searchers
from conducting a second search, conditional on . This excess obfuscation makes it harder
to sustain equilibria in which consumers search, as the lowest t such that  ++t  V (pm)
(the stopping condition) may be so high that  + t > V (1) (the negation of the entry
condition), precluding costly searcher entry. To put this another way, in the convex search
costs model we could always simultaneously satisfy the entry and stopping conditions as
long as g() was less than V (1). Now, the dierence between  and E[] drives a wedge
between the entry and stopping conditions, so we may not be able to satisfy them both
simultaneously.
We now provide a complete characterization of the nontrivial PBE of the signal-jamming
19To see this, rst note that, if these two conditions hold, taking  t = V (1)    satises the constraints.
If the constraints hold,   V (1) is immediate and V (1)  V (p
m)    follows by subtracting the second
constraint from the rst.
31model. Because consumers search once in equilibrium, the distribution of prices must look
like the price distribution in Stahl's model for some search cost. But the selection turns out
to be dierent from that of our previous model. In the convex-search-cost model, the key
deviation that prevented almost all of these distributions from being equilibria was that a
rm could charge a price slightly above  p and obfuscate slightly more so that consumers
would not search again. This constraint on the PBE set no longer exists in the signal-
jamming model: the above deviation is a deviation to an out-of-equilibrium price, so the
rm cannot necessarily induce any consumers to have the beliefs about  that it would like
them to have after such deviations. In particular, a consumer who observes a price above
 p may believe that the rm that set this price also set very high obfuscation, which would
lead her to believe that  is very low. So, whereas in the convex costs model  p was xed at
pm, in this model the range of possible values for  p is determined by the entry and stopping
conditions.
It turns out that we often get an incomplete selection from the equilibria of Stahl's
model. Many price distributions may be possible.
Proposition 15 For every p 2 [0;pm), there is a nontrivial PBE price distribution Fp(p)
of the signal-jamming model with costless obfuscation with the supremum of the support of
Fp(p) equal to p only if
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R(p). Such a PBE exists if
and only if
R p
p D(p)Fp(p)dp   + and
R 1
p D(p)dp   . Furthermore, some nontrivial
PBE exists if  
R 1
0 D(p)Fpm(p)dp.
The proof is given in the Appendix. The main idea is to initially follow steps as in
our earlier characterizations and then introduce the new constraints as in the previous
proposition. The principle new intuition in this result as compared to Proposition 14 is
that if p < pm rms are tempted to price above p, so in equilibrium consumers must be
willing to undertake a second search after observing p > p when they believe that  is as
low as possible. A necessary condition for this is
R p
p D(p)Fp(p)dp   +, and Proposition
3215 shows that this condition and the requirement that the excess obfuscation problem is
not too severe are jointly sucient.
The main dierence in the outcome between the signal-jamming model and the convex
costs model is that in the signal-jamming model there may be PBE with  p < pm. Indeed
there will be parameter values for which such PBE exist while equilibria with  p = pm do
not. To construct equilibria with  p < pm, one simply assumes that consumers who see a
price greater than  p believe that  is low. Note that the necessary and sucient conditions
for the existence of an equilibrium with p = p tend to hold for intermediate values of p.
It is easy to see why p cannot be too low in equilibrium: if p is close to 0, rms would
deviate to price slightly above p and costly searchers would purchase even if they believe
that  is low. The argument for why p cannot be too high in equilibrium is more subtle
and comes from the excess obfuscation eect. The idea is that lower prices correspond to
higher consumer welfare and a larger gap between consumer welfare and the benet of a
second search conditional on observing p and , which makes it more likely that the excess
obfuscation needed to satisfy the stopping condition is not so great as to violate the entry
condition.
Finally, observe that even though Proposition 15 places both lower and upper bounds
on equilibria p, the last sentence of the proposition shows that existence of some nontrivial
PBE is guaranteed under conditions identical to those in the convex search cost model.
5.3 Analysis and comparative statics
We provide some observations about the emergence of equilibrium obfuscation and its eect
on prices, prots and consumer welfare, as we did in the convex-costs model. The results
here are slightly more subtle due to the range of PBE described in Proposition 15, but
two important ideas|that obfuscation occurs in equilibrium, and that obfuscation osets
changes in the exogenous component of consumer search costs|continue to come through.
In addition, we show that prices actually fall as the excess obfuscation problem described
above becomes more severe, i.e. as  decreases, but that nonetheless consumer welfare falls
in response to this as well.
Our rst corollary provides conditions sucient to imply that some obfuscation must
33take place. As in the convex search cost model, obfuscation must occur in equilibrium
unless exogenous search costs are so high that the stopping condition is satised with zero
obfuscation. We omit the proof, which is analogous to the proof of Corollary 1.
Corollary 3 In any nontrivial PBE with  p = p and + <
R p
p D(p)Fp(p)dp, where Fp
is given by equation (5), some rms set t > 0.




p D(p)Fp(p)dp is increasing in p for p < pm.
We rst show that the results on the eect of changes in the exogenous component
of consumer search costs on average equilibrium obfuscation and consumer welfare in this
model are qualitatively the same as in the convex search costs model with uniform obfus-
cation. That is, decreases in  lead to increases in both average obfuscation and consumer
welfare.
Proposition 16 The set of nontrivial PBE average obfuscation levels is decreasing in  in
the strong set order. Furthermore, for any p, the set of nontrivial PBE average obfuscation
levels corresponding to PBE with  p = p is decreasing in  in the strong set order.
Proposition 17 The set of nontrivial PBE values of the costly searchers' welfare is de-
creasing in  in the strong set order.
Proofs of these propositions are given in the appendix. Each builds o the observation
that in any nontrivial PBE with the upper bound of the price distribution equal to p < pm,
the average obfuscation level must be
R p
p D(p)Fp(p)dp  : consumers must not want to
search again if the price is p and they nd out that  =  and they must be willing to search
again if the rm deviates to any p > p. Proposition 16 reects that this obfuscation level
is decreasing in  and that the set of equilibrium obfuscation levels in equilibria with upper
20This assumption is implied by Assumption C in Stahl (1989), which is the same as the \Revenue
Condition" in Stahl (1996). As Stahl (1996) points out, this condition holds \for all concave (and linear)
demand functions, as well as many convex demand functions."
34bound pm is also decreasing in . An intuition for Proposition 17 is that, holding prices
xed, the direct eect of increasing  outweighs the indirect eect of reduced obfuscation, as
in Proposition 5. And, under Assumption 1, the set of PBE price distributions is increasing
in  in the strong set order, so the direct eect cannot be oset by favorable changes in the
price distribution.
While we nd Propositions 16 and 17 noteworthy, they do not depend on the signal-
jamming structure of our model. In particular, both of these results hold in the alternative
model where  is deterministic and search costs are linear.21 The main consequence of
the signal-jamming structure of the model for comparative statics, then, is the excess ob-
fuscation eect. To derive comparative statics on this eect (Propositions 18 and 19) we
consider changes in , holding E[] constant at zero.
Recalling that an increase in  corresponds to a decrease in the severity of the excess
obfuscation problem, Proposition 18 shows that an increase in the severity of this problem
leads to a decrease in prices, which is perhaps a surprising result. The intuition here
is that the excess obfuscation problem rules out equilibria with high prices, as per the
discussion following Proposition 15, so increasing the severity of the excess obfuscation
problem eliminates equilibria with the highest prices. Proposition 19 shows that, if all
equilibria have  p < pm this eect cannot overturn the direct welfare costs to consumers
of an increase in excess obfuscation, because excess obfuscation leads to lower prices only
by making consumers suciently worse o that they refuse to enter when prices are high.
The assumption that equilibria with  p = pm do not exist is needed for this result because
equilibria with  p = pm can have very high obfuscation, since the only upper bound on
obfuscation in this case is the entry condition, while equilibria with  p < pm must also
have low enough obfuscation that rms are not tempted to deviate to prices slightly above
 p, which makes comparing consumer welfare across equilibria with  p < pm and  p = pm
dicult. So long as equilibria with  p = pm do not exist, then, Propositions 18 and 19 show
that, while equilibrium requires that rms expropriate some of the additional surplus that
comes with an increase in  through reduced reduced excess obfuscation, consumers are still
better o after such a reduction in uncertainty, at least in the strong set order sense. In this
21However, rms would not have a strict incentive to obfuscate in such a model.
35sense increases in  are Pareto-improving, even though they make markets less competitive
in that they raise equilibrium prices.
Proposition 18 The set of nontrivial PBE values of  p is increasing in  in the strong
sense order.
Proof. Recall that p is a nontrivial PBE value of  p if and only if
R p
p D(p)Fp(p)dp   +
and
R 1
p D(p)dp   . And
R p
p D(p)Fp(p)dp is increasing in p for p < pm by assumption,
while
R 1
p D(p)dp is decreasing in p, so an increase in  raises the lower bound on  p given
by the rst inequality and raises the upper bound of  p given by the second. 
Proposition 19 Suppose that no PBE with  p = pm exist when the lower bound on  equals
 or 0 for some 0  . Then increasing the lower bound on  from  to 0 increases the
set of PBE values of consumer welfare in the strong set order.
Proof. Suppose that 0   and u0  u, where u is a PBE value of consumer welfare
with lower bound on  given by  and u0 is a PBE value of consumer welfare with this
lower bound given by 0Denote the upper bound of the price distribution yielding consumer
welfare u by  p and denote the corresponding upper bound for u0 by  p0. We must show that
u0 is a PBE value when the lower bound is given by  and that u is a PBE value when this
bound is given by 0.
We have that  p and  p0 are both less than pm, so the proof of Proposition 15 gives that
R  p
 p =  +  +  t and
R  p0
 p0 =  +  +  t0, where  t and  t0 are average obfuscation levels corre-
sponding to PBE with price upper bound  p and welfare u, and price ceiling  p0 and welfare
u0, respectively. Recall that u =
R 1
 p F p(p)D(p)dp       t, so we have u =
R 1
 p D(p)dp + 
and u0 =
R 1








The Intermediate Value Theorem them implies that there exists p 2 [ p;  p0] such that
u =
R 1
p D(p)dp + 0, which then implies that u is a PBE value of consumer welfare when
the lower bound on  is given by 0 and the upper bound on p is given by p. The argument
for u0 is similar. 
36Finally, we remark that the mechanics of the model we have presented in this section
dier from those of standard signal-jamming models in an important way: Usually, the
marginal benet to jamming the signal is positive in equilibrium, and the equilibrium
quantity of signal-jamming is determined by marginal signal-jamming costs that increase
in the quantity of signal jamming. In our model, however, the marginal cost of signal-
jamming is held constant at zero, so equilibrium requires that the marginal benet of
signal-jamming equal zero as well. This is what leads to Proposition 13 and the excess
obfuscation eect; in equilibrium, search costs must be so high that consumers search only
once even when they observe the highest possible realization of p and the lowest possible
realization of . We believe that this model with costly obfuscation would look more like
a standard signal-jamming model. That is, signal-jamming costs would be convex, so in
equilibrium the marginal benet of signal-jamming would remain positive, implying that
rms that charged high prices would not sell to consumers when the realization of  was
low. We view the analysis of this kind of model as a promising avenue for future research,
though the failure of Proposition 13 to hold in such a setting would naturally make simple
expressions for the equilibrium price and obfuscation distributions unlikely.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have explored obfuscation using two related models in which obfuscation is
treated as an action that increases the amount of time that consumers must spend to learn
a rm's price. In both cases, the key impact of such actions is that they lead consumers to
behave as if future search costs will be higher. In the convex-costs model this is because
obfuscation directly increases the incremental costs that consumer would incur to perform
another search. In the signal jamming model there is no real eect on the future, but an
informational linkage implies that increased obfuscation leads consumers to expect higher
future search costs.
In both models, we show that obfuscation must occur in an equilibrium unless the
exogenous component of consumer search costs is high enough that consumers are willing
to purchase at the highest equilibrium price in the absence of obfuscation. And we show that
obfuscation has the same qualitative impact on welfare. It is bad for consumers both because
37it directly imposes costs on them and because it leads to higher prices. The higher prices
make obfuscation benecial for rms, except in the case when excess obfuscation makes
the market completely collapse. Note that obfuscation benets all rms, not only those
who engage in it; even transparent rms benet from serving an obfuscation-rich market,
as their customers are prevented from comparison-shopping by other rms' obfuscation.
The mechanics of our models are similar to those of Stahl (1989). In both cases ob-
fuscation can be seen as selecting among the dispersed price equilibria of Stahl's model.
In the convex-costs model, the selection is that obfuscation must be suciently high to
result in an equilibrium price distribution that goes all the way up to the monopoly price.
In the signal-jamming model, the constraints are that overall obfuscation levels must be
suciently high so that consumers are willing to search once, but never more than once.
This can leave a range of possible dispersed-price equilibria.
Our two models also have similar comparative statics implications. In both, equilibrium
obfuscation adjusts to oset changes in the exogenous component of consumer search costs,
though in equilibrium consumers still benet from reductions in exogenous search costs and
are hurt by increases in these costs. The signal-jamming model is also distinguished by the
fact that it displays excessive obfuscation with probability one; prices fall as the severity of
this problem increases, but consumer welfare decreases.
Our analysis suggests a number of interesting avenues for future research. Our char-
acterizations of the costly obfuscation model are limited. In reality we feel that it takes a
great deal of cleverness for rms to devise eective obfuscation schemes, which could make
such schemes quite costly. Such costs would be natural candidates for explaining why real-
world obfuscation is limited. For example, we noted that whereas our convex costs model
with costless obfuscation predicts that obfuscation will completely oset any technological
reduction in search costs, Ellison and Ellison (2009) report that search is still fairly eective
for at least some consumers in the environment they study. Developing models of costly
obfuscation that are more tractable than ours could be challenging, but could have rewards
both from a theoretical and from an applied perspective.
Relatedly, an important constraint on real-world obfuscation may be that consumers
will give up on a rm before learning its price. In some of our models our analyses can
38be justied by assuming that consumers beliefs are such that they expect the remaining
duration of search to be short enough so that continuing with current rm is better than
paying  to start over. But in other cases correlations between p and t will prevent such
justications. And in in any case there may be interesting lessons to learn from thinking
about models in which search is a real continuous time stopping problem rather than just
a series of one or zero decisions about whether to visit each rm.
Finally, we note that there are more basic related areas of search theory that have
not been fully explored. We mentioned that assuming that search costs are convex rather
than constant can create an environment in which search strategies are more interesting
and realistic, with dierent consumers searching dierent number of times. Stahl (1996)
explores one way to get such behavior by adding heterogeneous search costs, but the convex
cost model could be a valuable complement and provide additional insights.
39Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We proceed by induction on the number of remaining unsearched
stores. The result is immediate when zero stores remains unsearched. So assume that we
have shown the result for all numbers of remaining unsearched stores up to m. Denote
a history xn = ((p1;t1);(p2;t2);:::;(pn;tn)) and let p0 = minfp1;:::;png and t0 = n +
Pn
i=1 ti.
First, suppose that V (p0) > Et [g(t0 +  + t)   g(t0)]. Consider the continuation strat-





p D(p)F(p)dp Et [g(t0 +  + t)] >
R 1
p0 D(p)dp g(t0) con-
ditional on reaching xn while stopping at xn yields utility
R 1
p0 D(p)dp   g(t0). By the
inductive hypothesis, any strategy of the desired form yields a weakly higher expected pay-
o than the strategy of continuing at xn and stopping at xn+1 regardless of (pn+1;tn+1),
so any such strategy yields a strictly higher expected continuation payo conditional on
reaching xn than does any strategy involving stopping at xn.
Now suppose that V (p0) < Et [g(t0 +  + t)   g(t0)]. Consider the alternate model
where search costs are xed at c  Et [g(t0 +  + t)   g(t0)]. In the alternate model, it
is well-known that in any sequentially rational strategy the consumer stops at xn.22 But,
relative to expected continuation payos conditional on reaching xn in the alternate model,
expected continuation payos conditional on reaching xn in the original model are the same
for the strategy that stops at xn and are lower for any strategy that continues at xn. So in
any sequentially rational strategy in the original model the consumer stops at xn as well.
Therefore, any strategy of the desired form yields a strictly higher expected continuation
payo than any strategy not of this form when there are m+1 remaining unsearched rms,
so the result for m = N follows. 
Proof of Proposition 7. In any minimal obfuscation NE the support of the rms' mixed
strategies contains a single obfuscation level t(p) for each price p in the support. Every NE of
the costless obfuscation model in which costly searchers enter has the distribution of prices
F(p) given in Proposition 3. A rm i that chooses (pi;ti) from the joint distribution of price
22See Kohn and Shavell (1974) or Weitzman (1979).
40and obfuscation levels in such an equilibrium cannot reduce its obfuscation level and still
sell to costly searchers if and only if either ti = 0 or Ep[g(2 +t(p)+ti) g( +ti)] = V (pi).
Hence, our problem is to nd a function t(p) such that, for every pi,
t(pi) = inffti 2 R+ : Ep[g(2 + t(p) + ti)   g( + ti)]  V (pi)g
where p has cdf F(p).
Let T be the operator given by
T(t(p))(pi) = inffti 2 R+ : Ep[g(2 + t(p) + ti)   g( + ti)]  V (pi)g:
Note that T is well dened by our assumptions that  > 0 and limt!1 g0(t) = 1. T is
the best-response operator when rms have lexicographic preferences for rst maximizing
prot and then minimizing obfuscation, given their prices, so it will suce to show that
T has a xed point and that costly searchers enter when obfuscation levels are given by a
xed point of T. We will proceed by applying the Schauder Fixed Point Theorem, which
states that any continuous map from a nonempty, compact, and convex subset of a Banach
space to itself has a xed point.
First, note that T is single-valued. Recall that the space of continuous functions
t : [p;pm] ! R under the sup norm is a Banach space. We claim that T is a continu-
ous map with respect to the topology induced by this norm. To see this, observe that if
t(p)  t0(p) for every p, then T(t(p))(p0)  T(t0(p))(p0) for every p0. So given t(p) and  > 0,
supt0(p):jt0(p) t(p)j jT(t(p))   T(t0(p))j = maxfjT(t(p))   T(t(p) + )j;jT(t(p))   T(t(p)   )jg,
where t(p)+ is notation for the function ^ t(p)  t(p)+ for all p and t(p)  is dened anal-
ogously. By convexity of g, lim!0 maxfjT(t(p))   T(t(p) + )j;jT(t(p))   T(t(p)   )jg =
0, which ensures continuity of T:
Finally, we must show that we can restrict our attention to a nonempty, compact, and
convex subset of the space of continuous functions t : [p;pm] ! R. Let t0(p) = 0 for all p
and let t1(p) = infft : g(2 + t)   g( + t)  V (p)g. Let
S =

t : [p;pm] ! R : t is continuous and t0(p)  t(p)  t1(p) for all p
	
Note that t1(p)  ~ t for all p, so costly searchers enter if obfuscation levels are given by t1(p),
and therefore also enter if obfuscation levels are given by t(p) for any t 2 S. Clearly, S is
41nonempty, compact, and convex. Furthermore, T maps S to itself. For T(t(p))(p0)  0 by
denition and T(t(p))(p0)  t1(p0) for all t 2 S, by our observation that T maps uniformly
higher functions to uniformly lower ones, since t(p)  t0(p) for every t in S. Finally, every
function in the image of T is continuous by our assumption that g00 is continuous. So S is
a nonempty, compact, and convex subset of a Banach space and T : S ! S is continuous,
so T has a xed point in S by the Schauder Fixed Point Theorem, which gives a minimal
obfuscation NE. 
Proof of Proposition 15. The rst part of the proposition is the usual condition for
rms to be indierent between charging any two prices in

p;p
, as in Stahl (1989), for
example.
For the second part, rst note that the conditions
R p
p D(p)Fp(p)dp   +  and
R 1
p D(p)dp    hold if and only if there exists a  t  0 such that  + t 
R 1
p D(p)Fp(p)dp
and  +  +  t =
R p
p D(p)Fp(p)dp. For if the former two conditions hold, taking  t =
R p






p D(p)Fp(p)dp; and if the latter condition holds,
R p
p D(p)Fp(p)dp   +
is immediate and
R 1
p D(p)dp    follows by subtracting the equality in the latter condi-
tion from the inequality in it.
Now if there is no  t  0 such that  +  t 
R 1
p D(p)Fp(p)dp and  +  +  t =
R p
p D(p)Fp(p)dp, there can be no PBE of the desired form. To see this, rst note that
costly searchers will not enter if the rst inequality is violated and costly searchers will
search for a second time if they observe price p and face average obfuscation  t if the right-
hand side of the equality is strictly greater than the left-hand side, which is impossible in
PBE by Proposition 13. And if the right-hand side of the equality is strictly less than the
left-hand side, then a rm would be able to protably deviate to setting price slightly above
p > p, as costly searchers would still buy at such a price with probability one and such a
rm makes zero prot from costless searchers.
If there exists a  t  0 such that + t 
R 1
p D(p)Fp(p)dp and ++ t =
R p
p D(p)Fp(p)dp,
consider the strategy prole where all rms set obfuscation level equal to
R p
p D(p)Fp(p)dp 
( + )  0 and randomize their prices according to Fp(p), and suppose that consumers




. Under these strategies, rms sell to all consumers who visit them rst and
are indierent among all prices in

p;p
, so the only deviation that could possibly be
protable would be that to a price greater that p. But a consumer that observes ^ p > p
expects to face search cost
R p
p D(p)Fp(p)dp   ( + ) +  +  =
R p
p D(p)Fp(p)dp from





doing so, so a rm that deviated to such a price would not sell to consumers. So this is a
PBE.
Finally, suppose that  
R 1
pm D(p)Fpm(p)dp. If   
R 1
pm D(p)dp, then a nontrivial
PBE with p = pm exists by Proposition 14. So suppose that   >
R 1
pm D(p)dp. Then
0 <  + <
R pm
pm D(p)Fpm(p)dp. Note that
R p
p D(p)Fp(p)dp equals 0 if p equals 0, equals
R pm
pm D(p)Fpm(p)dp if p equals pm, and is continuous in p. Therefore, the Intermediate
Value Theorem implies that there exists a p such that + =
R p
p D(p)Fp(p)dp. Therefore,



















where the second inequality again uses the assumption that
R p
p D(p)Fp(p)dp is increasing
in p for p < pm. The characterization in the rst part of the proposition then implies
that a PBE exists with  p = p. 
Proof of Proposition 16. If p < pm, then the proof of Proposition 15 implies that
the unique nontrivial PBE level of average obfuscation is
R p
p D(p)Fp(p)dp      , which
is decreasing in . If p = pm, then the proof of Proposition 14 implies that nontrivial
PBE average obfuscation may take on any value in between the lower bound given by
V (pm)    and the upper bound given by V (1) , both of which are decreasing in .
So the second sentence in the proposition is proved.
Now suppose that 0  ,  t0   t, and  t0 is a nontrivial PBE average obfuscation level for
43a price distribution with supremum  p0 when exogenous search costs are given by 0, while
 t is a nontrivial PBE average obfuscation level for a price distribution with supremum  p
when exogenous search costs are given by . We must show that  t0 is also a nontrivial
PBE average obfuscation level when exogenous search costs are given by , and that  t is a
nontrivial PBE average obfuscation level when exogenous search costs are given by 0.
From the proofs of Propositions 14 and 15, a nontrivial PBE with price upper bound
 p, exogenous search costs  and average obfuscation  t satises  +  +  t =
R  p
 p D(p)F p(p)dp
if  p < pm and  +  +  t 
R  p
 p D(p)F p(p)dp if  p = pm. By Assumption 1, this implies that
 p0   p, since 0   and  t0   t.
If  + +  t0 >
R pm
pm D(p)Fpm(p)dp, then by the assumption that 0   and Assumption
1, 0 +  +  t0 >
R  p
 p D(p)F p(p)dp for all  p < pm, so we must have  p0 = pm. This implies that
0 +  t0 
R 1
pm D(p)Fpm(p)dp, so  +  t0 
R 1
pm D(p)Fpm(p)dp, in which case  t0 is a nontrivial
PBE average obfuscation level for a price distribution with supremum pm when exogenous
search costs are given by , by Proposition 14. Otherwise, we have
R  p
 p D(p)F p(p)dp   +
 +  t0 
R  p0
 p0 D(p)F p0(p)dp. Since
R p
p D(p)Fp(p)dp is continuous in p, by the Intermediate
Value Theorem there exits p such that  +  +  t0 =
R p
p D(p)Fp(p)dp, which combined
with the facts that
R 1
 p D(p)dp   ,
R 1
 p0 D(p)dp   ,  p  p   p0, and Proposition 15
implies that  t0 is a nontrivial PBE average obfuscation level for a price distribution with
supremum p when exogenous search costs are given by .
The argument for why  t is a nontrivial PBE average obfuscation level when exogenous
search costs are given by 0 is very similar. 
Proof of Proposition 17. Let u, u0, , and 0 be as in the proof of Proposition 5. Suppose
throughout that u is the value of consumer welfare for a nontrivial PBE with price upper
bound  p and that u0 is the value of consumer welfare for a nontrivial PBE with price upper
bound  p0. Let  t ( t0) be the average obfuscation level in a nontrivial PBE with price upper
bound  p ( p0) that yields costly searcher welfare u (u0) when exogenous search costs are 
(0).
We rst claim that  p   p0. This is trivial if  p = pm, so suppose that  p < pm. By the
proof of Proposition 15, u =
R 1
 p D(p)dp + , and, by the proofs of Propositions 14 and 15,
u0 
R 1
 p0 D(p)dp + . So since u0  u it must be the case that  p0   p.
44Next, we note that the set of nontrivial PBE prices is increasing in  in the strong
set order. Restricting attention to price distributions with  p < pm, this follows imme-
diately from Proposition 15 and Assumption 1. To see that there is no problem caused
by PBE with  p = pm, recall from Proposition 14 that such a PBE exists if and only if
  V (1) and
R 1
pm D(p)dp   . Therefore, the set of nontrivial PBE prices must be
increasing in  in the strong set order if there cannot be nontrivial PBE when  > V (1)
and
R 1
pm D(p)dp   . This is true because  + 
R  p
 p D(p)F p(p)dp and  p < pm imply that
 +  <
R pm
pm D(p)Fpm(p)dp, by Assumption 1; so if  > V (1), then   >
R 1
pm D(p)dp.
We consider separately the cases where  p < pm and where  p = pm. If  p < pm, the fact
that the set of nontrivial PBE prices is increasing in  in the strong set order implies that
a nontrivial PBE with price upper bound equal to  p exists when exogenous search costs
equal 0. Recall from the proof of Proposition 15 that in a nontrivial PBE with price upper
bound  p < pm, exogenous search costs  and average obfuscation  t, costly searcher welfare
equals
R 1
 p D(p)dp+, since  + t =
R  p
 p D(p)F p(p)dp . This does not depend on  or  t, so
a nontrivial PBE with price upper bound equal to  p and exogenous search costs 0 yields
costly searcher welfare u. Similarly, if  p < pm then  p0 < pm and there exists a nontrivial
PBE with price upper bound equal to  p0 when exogenous search costs equal , and such a
PBE yields costly searcher welfare u0
Finally, suppose that  p = pm. By Proposition 14, this implies that
R 1
pm D(p)dp   .
Since the set of nontrivial PBE prices is increasing in  in the strong set order and is
nonempty when exogenous search costs equal 0, a nontrivial PBE with price upper bound
pm exists when exogenous search costs equal 0, so 0  V (1). Letting  t take values
between
R pm
pm D(p)Fpm(p)dp and V (1)   0, we see that nontrivial PBE with price upper
bound pm exist that yield every value of costly searcher welfare between
R 1
pm D(p)dp+ and
0, when exogenous search costs equal 0. So if u 
R 1
pm D(p)dp + , we already have shown
that a nontrivial PBE yielding costly searcher welfare u exists when exogenous search costs
equal 0. If u >
R 1
pm D(p)dp + , recall that u  u0, the costly searcher welfare when price
upper bound equals  p0 and exogenous search costs equal 0. This implies that  p0 < pm, and
u0 =
R 1
 p0 D(p)dp + . Since
R 1
 p D(p)dp is increasing in  p for  p < pm, by the Intermediate
Value Theorem there exists  p 2 ( p0;pm) such that
R 1
 p D(p)dp+ = u. By Proposition 15,
45there exists a nontrivial PBE when exogenous search costs equal 0 with price upper bound
 p that yields costly searcher welfare u.
It remains only to show that if  p = pm, there exists a nontrivial PBE when exogenous
search costs equal  that yields costly consumer surplus u0. If  p0 < pm, then this follows
exactly as in the case where  p < pm. If  p0 = pm, then it can easily be checked that there
exists a nontrivial PBE with exogenous search costs , price upper bound pm, and average
obfuscation  t   t0 + 0    yielding costly searcher surplus u0. 
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